Please reply to this post by responding to the following:
The readings this week covered the topic of strategic communication and public diplomacy. Compare and contrast them. Select an example and provide a brief summary. If the example is complex, select one aspect of this example. Specifically, select a given actor and specific practice. Explain a bias or error (Weeks 1 and 2) that might be at play in your chosen example, in terms of how it might make this communication more or less effective.
Forum Feedback Instructions
Your Initial Post must be:
posted by Thursday evening;
a minimum of 250 words and closer to 500 words; and
contain reference to at least two of the lesson’s assigned readings.
Peer Responses: Respond to at least 2 other students
By Sunday evening; with
Responses between 100-200 words;
Containing reference to at least one of the lesson’s assigned readings; and
Include direct questions.
Forum Engagement & Professor Queries: In addition, you need to:
Monitor the postings throughout the week; and
Respond to my queries/questions.
Initial Post Due: Thursday, by 11:55pm ET
Responses Due: Sunday, by 11:55pm ET
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Lesson 2: Psychological Approaches to Influence
In this lesson we’ll engage in learning broader concepts that build on the last lesson’s psychological methods to extend our understanding of how these tools will used. The primary focus will be in the application of these methods to propaganda, but some other applications will also be touched on. We’ll also discuss at least one method of combating these practices to better combat deception efforts. This will be built on through the use of a simulation and discussion forum that integrates this work.
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.”
— Edward Bernays, Propaganda (1928)
Introduction
You will begin to integrate your understanding of some of the most common cognitive errors, caused by biases and heuristics, by looking at the broader manipulative processes in which they are used. The primary focus for this lesson are the works of Edward Bernays and Robert Cialdini. Both discusses processes that are now commonly employed across the human experience. Thus, their work should inform not only your understanding of government directed persuasion and deception efforts but also many processes used by other organizations to persuade humans individually and en masse.
Neither of these works are what you might expect of academic tomes. Both were written in common language at the time of publishing. You may find Bernays’ work a little stilted, because he used the more formal language of his period. Nevertheless, it was written to be understand by the average person. Likewise, Cialdini is certainly not an academic tome per se. In fact, it’s an easy read with a great deal packed into it. However, for the more academically minded there is a great deal that supports his points though with far more weighty sounding terms, i.e. “click-whirr” becomes “autonomous, culturally-derived derivative heuristics.” Nevertheless, it remains the same information.
Some find themselves surprised at how basic some of these things can be, but that’s exactly why they’re so powerful. They are patterns and systems that exist and operate much like our lungs or heart. We don’t have to think about them; they just work. Of course, sometimes intervention is needed by someone with understanding of these systems. That’s part of what we’re trying to develop here.
For example, the concept of “Social Proof,” as expressed by Cialdini, is seen in many ways, including aspects referred to as “leadership by example.” Leaders set the example in their behavior and thereby set the social contract for others to follow. As the organization develops, old members typically transmit these expectations and behaviors to new members. This is a bedrock concept in the military, but it’s seen in many human organizations from families to corporations. This is also something that can be seen in religious organizations, in addition to more extreme groups like cults or terrorist organizations. In each type of grouping the leader demonstrates behavior meant to be mimicked by his or her followers. Behind the scenes, leaders may engage in unfavorable behavior – drinking, drugs, sexual exploitation, etc. – that they condemn in public.
It is amazing how much consistency and authority work together too. This goes to the nature of humans to establish “safe” patterns by which all subsequent behavior is measured. Tracking these patterns provides the means for more subtle insertion efforts of actors into a situation. When an agent is to be inserted, using these patterns and principles is the primary means to appear “safe.” It’s social engineering on steroids (Hadnagy 2010).
Among the many examples noted in this lesson’s work, it’s the Milgram experiment that is often the most telling in terms of how far humans may be persuaded to act in ways they would not do so ordinarily. Most people would very much like to believe in the firm and reasoned thinking of most humans. However, as Cialdini points out, it doesn’t tend to work that way. What makes it even more frightening is the starting point from which Milgram began and what it points to in the dangers of human behavior. The question he was investigating was this:
“Was it that Eichmann and his accomplices in the Holocaust had mutual intent, in at least with regard to the goals of the Holocaust?” (Milgram 1965, 59).
The frightening part of his answer the behavior seen in Germany that supported the Holocaust is found in other cultures too. Further, there’s evidence that it’s not significantly hindered by factors like education, socio-economic class, or other matters that people tend to rely upon to prevent such things. In case you are interested, here are some other references to these efforts.
Blass, Thomas. 1991. “Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60: 398–413.
Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York: Harper-Collins.
Milgram, Stanley. 1974. “The Perils of Obedience.” Harper’s Magazine.
It’s exactly these tendencies and processes of human cognition that have led to extreme manipulation in modern times. Though Nazi Germany is perhaps the most common example, one should not forget the butchery that has been exacted under tyrants like Stalin, Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, and many others that in large part relied on these and other tools to bring about mass murder on a scale without comparison. Thus, understanding how to guard against these tools may be even more important than how to use them, if one comes from the viewpoint of modern democracies.
This lesson will also begin the discussion of propaganda, because the second author — Bernays — discusses influencing others through this form specifically, though his interest dovetails with elements of Cialdini’s Social Psychology and a desire for positive governance. You’ll be reading more about Cialdini’s techniques this week. Remember, these techniques can be applied in person-to-person exchanges, just as many of Cialdini’s examples show, but they can also be applied broadly across large populations. This is the place that Bernays and Cialdini overlap, though they use different terms and discuss different practices. One of the practices that employs these techniques and is emphasized this week is propaganda. Propaganda involves the use of information in three different ways (white, gray, and black) to influence others. Later, in the course we’ll touch on the use of these techniques in other forms of influence and deception such as camouflage and other forms of military deception. For now, let’s talk about propaganda.
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What is Propaganda?
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Though many of the same techniques used in propaganda are also used in marketing, public relations, etc., we distinguish between such efforts and traditional propaganda. For the purposes of this class, propaganda is the domain of states (countries) or proto-state governments, i.e. ISIS, Hezbollah, etc. If we were to call it all propaganda, then there would be little else. That’s why influence is a better overarching term. For example, if you were to read more of Bernays, you’d see that he’s essentially using the term propaganda in a much more vague way that is more consistent with the term influence as defined in Week 1. As governments seek to sway human opinion and spur human actions through crafted communication products, whether through white, gray or black means (see the Guth reading for specifics), they are employing propaganda.
Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda – Excerpt
Based upon Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda by Leonard W. Doob, published in Public Opinion and Propaganda; A Book of Readings edited for The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.
Propagandist must have access to intelligence concerning events and public opinion.
Propaganda must be planned and executed by only one authority.
It must issue all the propaganda directives.
It must explain propaganda directives to important officials and maintain their morale.
It must oversee other agencies’ activities which have propaganda consequences
The propaganda consequences of an action must be considered in planning that action.
Propaganda must affect the enemy’s policy and action.
By suppressing propagandistically desirable material which can provide the enemy with useful intelligence
By openly disseminating propaganda whose content or tone causes the enemy to draw the desired conclusions
By goading the enemy into revealing vital information about himself
By making no reference to a desired enemy activity when any reference would discredit that activity
Declassified, operational information must be available to implement a propaganda campaign
To be perceived, propaganda must evoke the interest of an audience and must be transmitted through an attention-getting communications medium.
Credibility alone must determine whether propaganda output should be true or false.
The purpose, content and effectiveness of enemy propaganda; the strength and effects of an expose; and the nature of current propaganda campaigns determine whether enemy propaganda should be ignored or refuted.
Credibility, intelligence, and the possible effects of communicating determine whether propaganda materials should be censored.
Material from enemy propaganda may be utilized in operations when it helps diminish that enemy’s prestige or lends support to the propagandist’s own objective.
Black rather than white propaganda may be employed when the latter is less credible or produces undesirable effects.
Propaganda may be facilitated by leaders with prestige.
Propaganda must be carefully timed.
The communication must reach the audience ahead of competing propaganda.
A propaganda campaign must begin at the optimum moment
A propaganda theme must be repeated, but not beyond some point of diminishing effectiveness
Propaganda must label events and people with distinctive phrases or slogans.
They must evoke desired responses which the audience previously possesses
They must be capable of being easily learned
They must be utilized again and again, but only in appropriate situations
They must be boomerang-proof
Propaganda to the home front must prevent the raising of false hopes which can be blasted by future events.
Propaganda to the home front must create an optimum anxiety level.
Propaganda must reinforce anxiety concerning the consequences of defeat
Propaganda must diminish anxiety (other than concerning the consequences of defeat) which is too high and which cannot be reduced by people themselves
Propaganda to the home front must diminish the impact of frustration.
Inevitable frustrations must be anticipated
Inevitable frustrations must be placed in perspective
Propaganda must facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets for hatred.
Propaganda cannot immediately affect strong counter-tendencies; instead it must offer some form of action or diversion, or both (Rouse 2003).
(For additional insight on Goebbel’s “Principles of Propaganda” consider also reading: Doob, Leonard W. 1950. “Goebbel’s Principles of Propaganda.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no. 3 (Autumn): 419-442, which can currently be found here.)
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Adaptations of Propaganda Principles
One of the core tenets of good propaganda is to play to people’s laziness. Don’t try to push them too far or think too hard. This is the way of demagogues generate long-term damage when used over time, but it’s a classic strategy that works. One can read detailed accounts as far back as 2,500 years ago in Thucydides’ History of the Pelopennesian War. A classic work that remains relevant today given its continuing insights into international security. However, for our purposes today, it comes down to casting allegations that might fit to audiences that are willing to not be too choosy. They want action, and they want it in a way that fits their limit knowledge and their more expansive prejudices.
The question raised by informed members of society isn’t one of whether manipulation exists, but rather the question of whose manipulation predominates. Elites shift public opinion as a daily matter of course, and realities are formed that few can escape (Ellul 1965, 87). In this process, they manipulate individual and mass human behavior. As Ellul wrote, “The individual who burns with desire for action but does not know what to do is a common type in our society. He wants to act for the sake of justice, peace, progress, but does not know how. If propaganda can show him this ‘how’ then it has won the game; action will surely follow” (1965, 209).
Continuing Adaptations of Propaganda Principles
Notably, these concepts do not conflict with others with different philosophical viewpoints to include near opposites. For example, Saul Alinsky, an American, left-wing activist who was also an avowed agnostic and often referred to as a Marxist or Communist though he held no formal membership in organizations of either, articulates many related views in his book Rules for Radicals that has informed many modern political information efforts. He uses a wide range of sources for his work to include classic, Soviet agitprop, and others. For those interested, a full text of this work can be found here.
First, he sees the power of information as something more potent than the raw power of force, though he was not adverse to force per se. For example, he wrote: “Power comes out of the barrel of a gun!” is an absurd rallying cry when the other side has all the guns” (Alinsky 1971, xxi). He continues: “this failure of many of our younger activists to understand the art of communication has been disastrous. Even the most elementary grasp of the fundamental idea that one communicates within the experience of his audience — and gives full respect to the other’s values — would have ruled out attacks on the American flag” (Alinsky 1971, xviii). He also emphasized a realistic assessment of the context in which one must operate: “As an organizer I start where the world is, as it is, not as I would like it to be. That we accept the world as it is does not in any sense weaken our desire to change it into what we believe it should be — it is necessary to begin where the world is if we are going to change it to what we think it should be” (Alinsky 1971, xix).
From this beginning, Alinsky offers 12 rules aimed at creating information campaigns that primarily benefited the American political left. One thing that should be clear is that Alinsky operates under the view that the ends justify the means. Thus, those with more traditional morals may be surprised if not prepared. And yet, this thinking has informed propaganda and other information operations efforts regardless of political slant. The thing to remember is that a careful profile of opposing organization and leaders is essential in understanding how these concepts may be applied within the opponents cognitive/moral framework. And with that, it’s off to the readings!
ALINSKY’S 12 RULES
Knowledge Check
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Question 1
As governments seek to sway human opinion and spur human actions through crafted communication products, whether through white, gray or black means (see the Guth reading for specifics), they are employing propaganda.
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False
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Abstract image of a propaganda poster that says conclusion
In this lesson we engaged in learning broader concepts that build on the last lesson’s psychological methods to extend our understanding of how these tools will used in persuading humans in both deceptive and non-deceptive efforts. The focus of this discussion was provided by Edward Bernays and Robert Cialdini, both seminal thinkers in the modern discussion of persuasion. These included Bernays’ concepts and Cialdini’s “weapons” of influence. Both recognized the human propensity for not only accepting but even seeking means to confirm their existing biases and ease their cognitive processing load, even if it meant negative consequences for the individual.
There are many “weapons” that are used by those seeking to influence human behavior. These are pervasive in our environment. Many, like Cialdini’s, are fungible, because they can be applied in any situation that involves human interaction. The primary focus this week was applying these methods to human actions in general and propaganda specifically. We’ll also discussed at least one method of combating these practices to better avoid being controlled by these efforts.