Accidents may be inevitable. However, they don’t just come by default as there must be some factors behind them happening. The united airlines flight was a well scheduled, and all tests well passed, cargo flight to Chicago, with an intermediate stop in Salt Lake City, Utah from San Francisco, California on December 17, 1977. However the flight did not reach its destination owing to an accident crash into a mountain in the Wasatch Range near Kaysville Utah killing the three crew members who were the only occupants. Air crashes are not just another ‘playground’ accidents but very serious incidents that are hardly expected. For this reason, according to the NTSB report, the United Airlines accident might be attributed to factors which may include:

• The malfunctioning of the aircraft’s No.1 electrical system as the flight descended for the approach to Salt Lake City airport. The No.1 electrical bus malfunctioned and was not in operation thus all of its affiliated electrical components were not in operation too. Also the No.1 communications radio was powered through the No.1 electrical bus which is contrary to the United’s DC-8 stipulations thus causing the radio to be inoperative since the No.1 bus had failed. Due to the breakdown of the No.1 bus, the flight crew could not well verify the landing gear extension too for it is powered by the No.1 electrical bus (No Author, 1978).
• The accident may also be attributed to the failure of the flight crew to inform the ATC concerning the loss of communications radio impairing the capability of the flight to operate the IFR in the ATC system and breaking down an assistance from the ATC (No Author, 1978).
• Third, the holding clearance that was issued by the approach controller was not complete with any attempts to clarify the clearance hitting a dead end thus ambiguity. The approach controller wanted the flight to hold north west on 331 degrees radial of the Salt Lake City VOR, but he never specified the radial causing the captain to head north without requesting a complete holding clearance, inclusive of a holding radial hence the first officer assuming the 360 degrees radial to be the holding radial which was very wrong and constituted to the accident happening (No Author, 1978).
• Also the ‘little minute’ leave request by the captain to the approach controller was quite misleading making the flight to disappear from the frequency for considerably seven and half minutes, had a hand to the accident. The flight was not also monitoring the Salt Lake City VOR for voice transmissions and the first officer never flew the holding pattern according to the established procedures consequently making the flight to fly into hazardous terrains (No Author, 1978).

 

However much we cite accidents as inevitable, they can be prevented too. Had there been price and good communication, and experience on radar communication from the captain and the approach controller, then the flight would have not crashed. To avoid such accidents, the flight crews and controllers must ensure conscious efforts towards precision in communication and strictly adhere to the stipulated procedures. The accident was quite preventable for so many factors, which could have been avoided, led to its happening. If there was an exchange of communication between the controller and the flight crew after the flight had gone back to the approach control frequency the situation would have been managed to safety. In addition, the failure of the electrical part alone will not have contributed to the accident. Also the electrical failure should have had a prior remedy or back up such that there is an alternative supply of power since before the flight clearance, it was already seen to be faulty (No Author, 1978).

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